Edmund L. Gettier
From Analysis 23 ( 1963): 121-123.
Transcribed into hypertext by Andrew Chrucky, Sept. 13, 1997.
Various attempts have been made in recent years to state prerequisite and sufficient conditions for aroundones cognize a given proposition. The attempts have often been such that they potful be stated in a form same to the following:1
a. S knows that P| IFF| i. P is true, ii. S believes that P, and iii. S is warrant in believe that P. |
For example, Chisholm has held that the following gives the infallible and sufficient conditions for knowledge:2
b. S knows that P | IFF| i. S accepts P, ii. S has nice evidence for P, and iii. P is true. |
Ayer has stated the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge as follows:3
c. S knows that P | IFF| i. P is true, ii. S is sure that P is true, and iii. S has the decently to be sure that P is true. |
I shall argue that (a) is faithlessly in that the conditions stated therein do not patch up a sufficient condition for the truth of the proposition that S knows that P.
The same argument will show that (b) and (c) fail if has adequate evidence for or has the right to be sure that is substituted for is justified in believing that throughout.
I shall begin by noting devil points. First, in that sense of justified in which Ss being justified in believing P is a necessary condition of Ss intentional that P, it is possible for a someone to be justified in believing a proposition that is in fact ludicrous Secondly, for any proposition P, if S is justified in believing P, and P entails Q, and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a declaration of this deduction, then S is justified in believing Q. holding these cardinal points in mind, I shall now present two cases in which the conditions stated in (a) are true for some proposition, though it is at the same time false that the person in question knows that proposition.
Case I|
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